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I. Introduction
The process of economic integration within the EC has gained new
momentum through project '92 while the Eastern European
counterpart, the COMECON, is disintegrating rapidly. The collapse
of the socialist economies shows that the market system has
proved its superiority in terms of productive efficiency and
innovation as well as in terms of reaching social and
environmental goals. For the next decade, however, a global
competition of locations will challenge the EC. North America and
the Pacific Rim will be the EC's major competitors. In order to
successfully compete the EC will have to optimize its internal
integration process. Inefficient national regulatory systems will
be punished more and more by emigration of firms, capital and
qualified labor.
Prior to 1985 the EC had followed the approach of centrally
harmonizing national regulations from above. Moreover, up to this
date lengthy negotiations in Brussels were unavoidable in order
to reach unanimous desicions. Since 1985 two important changes in
the EC's constitution have simplified the integration process:
majority voting with respect to a wide range of problems and
mutual recognition of national regulations. The poor results of
the centralized harmonization procedure gave rise to the idea
that there might be no need to define the EC regulation at all
but instead to let different national regulations exist at the
same time.
*
Preliminary version of a paper accepted for publication in
"Aussenwirtschaft". Helpful comments by Bert Hofman and Stefan
Sinn are gratefully acknowledged.This paper presents the basic analytics of the competitive
process among national regulations and establishes the necessary
conditions for the optimality of the competition approach.
Factors, such as strategic behavior, low factor mobility, and
externalities that may negatively influence the results of
institutional competition are discussed. In order to secure the
superiority of the competition solution, the development of
institutional arrangements, a set of rules for the competition of
EC governments, is suggested.
II. The Concept of Institutional Competition
The idea of competition between jurisdictions clearly goes back
to the seminal work of Tiebout (1956) who examined the
competition of communities. Recently, the approach has been used
by the Kiel Institute of World Economics (Giersch 1989, S. Sinn
1989, 1990, Siebert 1989b) and applied to various policy matters,
e.g. environmental policy (Oates, Schwab 1988, Siebert 1989a, and
Long, Siebert 1990) as well as regional policy (Soltwedel 1987).
In economic theory, the process and the outcome of competition
are well defined for factor and goods markets. If there is also a
market for legislation then how can the concept of competition be
applied to it? The good traded in this market, for simplicity
called legislation, can be defined as a composite commodity. It
comprises regulations, institutional arrangements, taxation, and
other government activities, such as the provision of public
goods. On the supply side of the market federal governments can
be identified. State and even local governments as well as
self-regulating institutions may also be suppliers of relevant
legislation. Private households and firms constitute the demand
side. From a theoretical point of view we assume legislation to
be a country-specific, immobile factor of production just like
land or the environment.
Given this description, how does the market for legislation work?
Governments can be thought of as maximizing the probability of
being reelected, with their objective function representing some
aggregate of individual utility functions. They offer the wholerange of regulations, activities and institutions of which the
good legislation consists. The variables of the utility functions
are a privately produced consumption good and a public good. To
simplify the analysis we assume that only central governments
exist and that these governments collect a tax, for instance per
unit of capital employed in the production process. With the tax
receipts a public good is financed that can be used for
consumption as well as for production, e.g. infrastructure,
education, and environmental quality. The public good may also
comprise institutional arrangements that assure a certain degree
of social and political stability. The tax rate is set as to
equate the marginal utility of the public good and the marginal
utility of the private good. The marginal utility of using a unit
of a resource in the production of the private good denotes the
opportunity costs of the public good.
Owners of financial capital and firms are assumed to maximize
profits whereas workers are utility maximizers. When making their
decisions on locations the internationally mobile factors
evaluate the legislation offered by the governments in terms of
their own maximization problems. In order to take advantage of
legislation it is necessary to domicile in or at least relocate
to the country where this legislation is offered. Of course, the
decision to move to another jurisdiction is made recognizing
other relocation related costs as well.
An important ingredient of institutional competition is the
distinction between mobile and immobile factors of production.
Land, environmental endowment and some types of labor, especially
unskilled labor, are immobile. Capital is highly mobile before it
is put in place (ex-ante). Even if it is put in place and one
follows the putty-clay-model capital is mobile ex-post in the
sense that depreciated capital may not be replaced. Admittedly,
this aspect of capital mobility takes time.
With respect to the mobility of technical knowledge, different
aspects have to be distinguished. As far as technical knowledge
is embodied in labor, such as skills of the craftsmen or
capabilities of managers, the mobility of technical knowledgedepends on the mobility of people. Information on new production
technologies or new products, i.e. blue print technical
knowledge, is mobile in principle but its mobility depends on
institutional arrangements such as the patent system, property
rights defining the transferability of knowledge, and the spatial
size of the owner (multinational firms). Basic knowledge tends to
be more mobile than applied knowledge. Over time technical
knowledge will diffuse, for instance with new suppliers
(countries) moving through the product cycle.
Institutional competition is the competition of the immobile
factor for the mobile factor (Giersch 1989). Governments try to
attract internationally mobile factors from abroad. The inflow of
factors of production generates an additional income for the
immobile factors. For instance, the inflow of capital raises the
marginal productivity of labor and should therefore make higher
wages possible. In a dynamic perspective an increased marginal
productivity of capital due to a better allocation would induce
additional investment. These positive effects of attracting
mobile factors are the major incentive for all governments to
invent better legislation . On the contrary, when mobile factors
emigrate they put a burden on the country they are leaving by
reducing the income of immobile factors there. Thus, the
respective government has an incentive to adjust the laws and
regulations to the needs of firms and households. Adjusted
regulations may again be attractive to other factors and factor
relocation to this country may occur.
In a wider interpretation, governments may not only provide pure
public goods but also merit goods, such as social physical
infrastructure, or merit goods relating to policy issues, for
instance consumer protection, social stability or stability of
the financial system to prevent bank runs. The optimal national
regulation equalizes the marginal benefits and the marginal costs
of regulations where the marginal benefits derive from an
additional unit of the merit good. In this case, marginal
1) A striking example of institutional competition is the exit of
East Germans to West Germany.opportunity costs do not arise from taxing private activities but
from restraining the use of resources in the private sector. In
this context, institutional competition may be interpreted as to
provide better information on the opportunity costs of regulation
and to break deadlocks of regulations established by national
pressure groups. Institutional competition then is a device to
reduce the political power of interest groups, i.e. to reduce
rent seeking in a society and to correct a policy failure; it is
an instrument to limit the maneuvering space of rent seekers and
thus to reduce the strategic capabilities of firms vis-a-vis
governments.
III. The Competition Approach to European Integration
In the EC of '92, the four freedoms, especially the exit
mechanism for capital and for qualified labor, created the
possibility for institutional competition. Will competition of
the 12 EC governments be the optimal solution to the integration
problem? According to standard welfare economics a Pareto-optimal
solution will be found on the market for legislation if this
market is fully competitive. This is true for a static solution
as well as in the long run. Even if we assume that politicians
and bureaucrats pursue their own interests taking the preferences
of the electorate only as a restriction for reelection,
competition would make this restriction more binding. "The taming
of the Leviathan" (S. Sinn 1990) could occur. In recognizing
competition as an "exploratory device", Hayek (1968) puts special
emphasis on the dynamic efficiency that competition is able to
generate.
Willgerodt (1975) argues that the crucial point of competition is
that the supply side faces incentives to get involved in
innovative activities: in the goods markets, these incentives are
temporary monopoly profits. The major welfare increasing effect
of innovation, however, stems from the socialization of the
innovation which in turn makes the monopoly profits disappear.
Monopoly profits will be eroded by competition among firms.
Thereby, an incentive for further research and innovation is set.On the market for legislation, the positive effects that the
attraction of mobile recources generate for a country can be
interpreted as the country's temporary monopoly profits. Although
there are no patents for legislation the advantage of offering an
improved type of legislation first can be quite valuable. This is
especially true when the other countries' direct costs of
imitation are high due to political obstacles.
The competition solution to European integration is appealing for
several reasons. First, no final piece of legislation has to be
found beforehand, various combinations of national regulations
may exist at the same time. This seems to be especially relevant
in an integrated market with fixed exchange rates. Without
floating exchange rates, differences in legislation may be one of
the few chances for the weaker economies to gain a comparative
advantage. Greek companies paying Danish tax rates or Portuguese
firms being subject to a German type social security system can
be predicted to go bankrupt fairly quickly. Second, competition
is an open ended approach of finding the "best" institutional
arrangement. It is profitable for countries to imitate successful
legislation or to try to come up with new laws where
unsatisfactory results were achieved. Third, harmonizing the
national laws from above has proved to be inefficient for
practical reasons. Fourth, institutional competition can be
viewed as an innovation for reducing institutional rigidities and
the power of vested interests. This especially holds if
institutional competition relates to national regulations that
define entry and exit conditions on goods and factor markets. The
Cassis-de-Dijon ruling of the European Court of Justice is the
major case in point. By establishing the country-of-origin
principle, the principle of mutual recognition was introduced,
which acts as a device to open up national regulations. This
seems to be the most important application of institutional
competition in the European setting.
Exit of factors of production is an important ingredient to
institutional competition. A high degree of factor mobility is
one of the major prerequisites for institutional arbitrage to
produce an efficient solution. In a whole series of articles(Feldstein, Horioka 1980, Obstfeld 1986) it was attempted to
measure the degree of international capital mobility. The results
were extremely ambiguous but for the EC Frankel (1989) found that
capital mobility is almost perfect with the negligible exceptions
of Ireland and Greece. In addition, EC direct investment in other
EC countries ranged from 15.4 per cent in the United Kingdom to
as much as 54.7 per cent of total inward investment in France
where more than one out of two francs came from the EC (Table 1
of the Appendix). On the contrary, labor mobility seems to be
extremely low. In the countries of the earlier EC of six the
stock of immigrants from other members of the EC of twelve
amounted to only 0.45 per cent of the whole EC population of 320
million. The numbers presented in table 2 of the appendix suggest
that relocation of private households is a rare exception.
Although there are no major restrictions on where citizens of EC
countries are allowed to settle down, specific regulations of the
labor markets and the systems of social security seem to
effectively limit labor mobility. This is also true for qualified
labor. Various kinds of arbitrary educational prerequisites bar
foreign applicants from obtaining jobs abroad and thus
relocation. It can, however, be expected that the liberalization
of the EC's service sector will increase the mobility of
qualified labor. In addition, technical know-how is considered to
be increasingly mobile internationally, especially if it is bound
to multinational corporations. Nevertheless, capital seems to be
the major force that can arbitrage between national regulations.
IV. Leveling the Playing Field?
Firms often complain that there are legislation induced cost
differentials between EC members. It is argued that once border
controls are abolished and market segmentations are significantly
reduced firms in some countries face a comparative cost
disadvantage due to different legislation. Since this
disadvantage is not related to the firms' productivity and
efficiency per se they claim to be harmed by unfair competition.
Therefore, a leveling of the playing field is requested, i.e.
regulations that directly alter costs or prices would have to be8
harmonized. For instance, the costs to meet environmental
standards or to employ labor differ between countries to some
extent due to differences in legislation.
Observing that factor price equalization is far from being
perfect, different prices for the immobile factors labor and
environment reflect differences in endowment but also in
productivity. They are the very reason for international trade
and for specialization in production. Harmonizing them would
reduce the efficiency in the allocation of resources and the
competitiveness of the EC. Moreover, in the EC with its basically
fixed exchange rate system a harmonization of endowments and an
artificial factor price equalization would destroy the
competitiveness of the less advanced economies. Consequently, the
political demand for leveling the playing field contradicts the
philosophy of international specialization.
Most prominent is the claim to harmonize the rates of value added
taxes (VAT). The point made is that without harmonization firms
in high tax countries will suffer from tax differentials and that
the international division of labor will not be determined by
comparative cost advantage but by comparative tax advantage.
However, value added tax rates ranging from 2.1 to 38 per cent
will open up almost unlimited opportunities for arbitrage once
the border controls are abolished. Shopping tourism and
mail-order firms would bloom by taking advantage of tax induced
price differentials. In regions near a border even nontradeables
might be subject to arbitrage. A reduction in tax revenues and
political pressure of then ailing firms would force governments
to lower the tax rates. On the other hand, countries with
relatively low rates may even raise their rates in order to
increase tax revenues. In the long run the gap between high and
low rates can be expected to be narrowed by institutional
competition and ex-ante harmonization is unnecessary.
Even if it is believed that the adjustment process of
institutional competition would work too slowly in the case of
value added taxes there are other ways of coping with the
problem. One is the harmonization of VAT rates described above.Since value added taxes basically serve the purpose of financing
government activities this option was vetoed by high tax
countries which would have lost a considerable amount of tax
revenues at once. Another approach has been adopted by the EC
Commission which leaves different national rates unchanged.
Domestic importers invoice the foreign VAT in the home country
and then pay the domestic VAT rate. An EC clearing institution
would have to redistribute the tax revenues.
The harmonization of tax rates as well as the bureaucratic
solution of the European Commission could be avoided by a
realignment of exchange rates (Siebert 1989c). The value added
tax would be levied according to the country-of-origin principle
with the domestic rate. The exchange rate change would just
offset the differences in VAT rates and the price of imports
would not change. The structure of VAT, the system of reduced and
higher rates on certain goods, could be left to institutional
2
competition .
V. The Problem of "Zero-Regulation"
Critics of the competition solution argue that the exit mechanism
for mobile factors forces countries to adjust their levels of
regulations in response to other countries that started to lower
their levels of regulations. Once the other countries have
adjusted their legislation, the first country may again start to
further relax its regulations. In the end, this tendency would
lead to a sub-optimal level of legislation, a state of
zero-regulation. On the other hand, a low regulation policy may
imply too low a level of government activities including the
supply of public goods. Is this a problem of destructive
competition so that there is a need for harmonization of national
legislation?
2) It is claimed that an exchange rate realignment would induce a
distortion with respect to consumption and investment goods. As
H.-W. Sinn (1990a, p.8) admits, there are, however, reasons to
assume that this distortion is not large.10
This reasoning has been applied to a number of policy issues. In
the tax competition debate it was claimed that the U.S. tax cuts
in the 1980's forced the European governments to lower their tax
rates as well in order to restore the competitiveness of their
countries. In the EC, the argument goes, much lower relocation
and other transactions costs would put even greater pressure on
high tax countries to adjust their tax rates. In the final stage,
the EC could look like a "single (large) tax haven (Giovannini,
Hines p. 1). In the context of environmental policy, lower
environmental standards could induce firms that use environment
intensively to relocate to countries where environment is
cheaper. To avoid continuous emigration of firms countries would
have to lower their environmental standards. Of particular
interest on the political stage is the zero-regulation issue when
it comes to the so called "Social Dimension" of the Common
Market. "Social Dumping" and "Death of the Insurance State"
(H.-W. Sinn 1990a p. 13) are the catchwords in this debate. What
is meant is that factor mobility may effectively limit
redistribution. Net payers of redistribution would emigrate to
countries with a rudimentary social security system whereas net
receivers of redistribution would gather in countries that offer
a high degree of income redistribution. Clearly, the country of
net receivers would be headed for bankruptcy.
At first sight, some evidence seems to support these arguments.
Take, for instance, corporate income tax rates. In the mid-
seventies the EC's average rate was approximately 47.21 per cent
with national rates ranging from 25 to as much as 56 per cent
(Table 3 of the Appendix). Until 1989, all EC members cut their
tax rates with the exceptions of Denmark and Italy. The EC's
average tax rate went down to 42.33 per cent. Similar synchronous
developments can also be recognized in the deregulation of
financial markets, of the airline and telecommunication
industries, and the privatization of state-owned firms.
Firms decide on where to locate their capital by equating its net
marginal rates of return in all countries. When the countries
compete one government may try to gain an advantage by lowering
the tax rate per unit of capital. Since this government offers a11
higher net-of-tax return on physical capital it attracts
additional capital from abroad. Could this tax cut be the
starting shot for a continuous process of lowering capital income
taxes?
Lower tax rates have a twofold effect. On the one hand, the
increase in the capital stock will lead to a higher production of
the private good. On the other hand, lower tax revenues will
reduce the level of infrastructure provided. If infrastructure is
an input to the production process the productivity of firms is
negatively affected. In addition, a lower level of public goods
directly makes the consumers worse off. The competitive process
balances these counteracting effects. In equilibrium the net
welfare effect of a marginal tax cut is zero. Therefore, we
observe a pressure on governments to use tax revenues efficiently
to provide public goods. There is, however, no tendency to reach
a tax rate of or close to zero. The reason for this clearly is
the existence of opportunity costs of a low tax rate policy. The
same reasoning is applicable to environmental policy where
environmental quality is affected by an emission tax. Again, the
opportunity costs of environmental quality forgone limit tax cuts
(Long, Siebert 1990).
The argument that zero-regulation will not come about rests on
the assumption that the user of the public good and the taxpayer
(and the voter) are identical. Under this condition public goods
are financed by benefit taxation with marginal benefits and
marginal costs being equal for the user and the payer of the
public good. This approach can be extended to the concept of
fiscal equivalence (Olson 1969) which implies appropriate
property rights that internalize (and privatize) the costs of a
public good. The members of a club enjoy the club good and
contribute to its financing. For instance, user charges may be
applied when firms employ the physical infrastructure (airports,
roads) in the production process. In some areas, it would indeed
be optimal to finance some of these goods privately, for example
in the communication industry. In transportation, more use could
be made of the private provision and of private financing of
"public" goods.12
The argument that zero-regulation will not result from
institutional competition seems to break down if the users and
the payers are different groups. However, in many cases there are
more subtle links between the user and the payer. For instance,
in vocational training, university education, and basic research,
firms benefit and would therefore be willing to pay capital
income taxes. Cultural infrastructure (museums, theaters etc.) is
an important location factor for firms because it is instrumental
in attracting qualified workers and managements.
In the financing of the social security system, the link between
the user and the payer may be weak from the firm's point of view,
but it still exists. Improved social security can lower the
riskiness of investment and increase labor productivity due to
fewer sick-leaves, less strikes or better motivation of the labor
force (Paque 1989). Since these factors increase the return on
capital firms are willing to pay contributions to the system of
social security. These payments can be interpreted as user
charges for the factor social stability.
The possibility of raising funds from capital for income
redistribution, however, seems to be effectively limited. In open
economies the scope for redistribution from mobile factors to
immobile ones is small (Giersch 1990). This is little more than
claiming that governments cannot tax a good with a high price
elasticity too much. This might be a reason to complain, it is
certainly not a reason to harmonize social security. Even if the
EC were to do so, capital would leave the EC and nothing would be
won.
The low degree of labor mobility generates an interesting effect
for the tax debate. If governments use tax receipts to provide
public goods firms will tend to move to the countries with a high
supply of public goods per unit of taxes they have to pay. In
order to attract capital, countries may lower their corporate tax
rates and offset lower tax revenues by higher personal income
taxes. This shift of the tax burden from capital to labor induces
a shift in the distribution of personal income. The direction of
redistribution depends on the national tax systems. If the taxBfbfiofhek
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burden shifts to the immobile factor, environmental taxes may be
used to provide a new source of government income.
So far labor mobility within the EC was rather low but this may
somewhat change in the near future, especially for highly
qualified labor. In this case, redistribution, even within the
labor force, would be more difficult to achieve. Exit of the net
payers would generate a pressure on governments to install
efficient social security systems. The switch from pay-as-you-go
systems to capital funding systems that was proposed, for
instance by Verbon (1989) for old age insurance, may be an
example. It would reduce intergenerational redistribution and put
emphasis on intragenerational redistribution. There are, however,
several reasons for net payers to agree on intragenerational
redistribution, e.g. a progressive income tax. Subsidizing
individuals with a low income may increase political and social
stability which may in turn improve profitability of investment
and business. In addition, a lower level of distributable funds
would force governments to use redistribution to help unskilled
labor earning a higher income, e.g. through better education.
Thereby the need for redistribution could be reduced.
Institutional competition possibly lowers the level of
redistribution. At the same time, it could increase the
efficiency of the national social security system and allow
national preference and a country's economic conditions to shape
this system.
VI. Market Failure - Justification for Harmonization?
The efficient market hypothesis depends on a number of
assumptions that the supporters of the harmonization solution
argue are not fulfilled on the EC's market for legislation. These
factors are the standard references for the emergence of market
failure. Market failure and subsequently an inferior allocation
of resources are mainly caused by the existence of externalities,
restrictions for market entry and exit, economies of scale, and
asymmetric information. Keeping, however, the optimality of the
full competition solution in mind, it is worthwhile to examine14
whether mechanisms for fixing market failure can be found without
the need for harmonization.
Externalities
The standard qualification of the perfect competition framework
usually made first is the hint at externalities. In the basic
model of the market for legislation, the attraction of mobile
factors induced positive effects of an additional income for a
country's immobile factors. In this rather broad definition of a
pecuniary externality where third parties are only affected via
|narkets the marginal conditions are not violated. Therefore, the
market for regulation would yield a Pareto-optimal allocation.
Technological externalities, as opposed to pecuniary
externalities, occur when one country directly affects the
variables of the production or utility functions of other
countries. The incurred costs or benefits are not taken into
consideration by the originating country and no compensation is
paid. Therefore, technological externalities cause legislation
that yields Pareto-inferior results .
The theoretical issue is exemplified for the case of
environmental policy, a field where technological externalities
often originate. As long as externalities are strictly limited to
one country as is the case with "hot spot" air pollution, noise,
and toxic wastes each government can decide on national
3) It it sometimes argued that externalities are involved when
international effects of domestic monetary and fiscal
stabilization policies are to be evaluated. In a Keynesian type
of setting the argument is that internal macroeconomic policies
generate externalities via trade and capital movements. Because
these externalities are not adequately remunerated or sanctioned
the supply of stabilization policies is either too high or too
low. Assume that in two countries a low rate of inflation is
included in the governments' utility functions. If one country
carries out an efficient anti-inflationary policy this directly
changes the production function for low inflation in the other
country. The problems arising in this context which makes use of
a different interpretation of legislation are, for instance,
discussed in Cooper (1985). Vaubel (1983) argues that the welfare
analysis of macroeconomic policy coordination rests on a
confusion of pecuniary and technological externalities.15
environmental regulations according to its own or its
constituency's preferences. This is true for determining the
quality of the environment as well as the instruments to achieve
a certain quality. In an international market for legislation the
voice mechanism of democracies is supplemented with an exit
mechanism for mobile resources that poses an additional
restriction on the governments. This exerts an influence on
national environmental policies but externalities within a nation
can still best be dealt with by national legislators.
How do international externalities affect this outcome? The
pollution of border-crossing rivers as well as air pollution are
clearly negative technological externalities and the market for
national legislations will fail to produce optimal solutions. A
number of proposals has been made on how the EC can deal with
international environmental spillovers (Siebert 1990b):
- In the case of unidirectional spillovers (rivers), a level of
pollution at the border, a diffusion norm, could be agreed upon
in a binational bargaining process. The agreement would have to
include side payments to the polluter in order to compensate for
additional abatement activities. This victim-pays solution
suffers from the possibility that the countries may strategically
overstate the abatement costs and the damage due to pollution,
respectively. In order to avoid strategic behavior a preference
revealing mechanism such as the Clarke tax or the Groves-Ledyard
mechanism would have to be agreed upon (Siebert 1987). If the
true revelation of costs and benefits could be achieved the
proposal would allow a decentralized environmental policy that
reaches environmental goals at minimum costs.
- Another approach would be to agree on the amount of all
trans-border water pollution. Emission licences could be issued
and countries would have to buy these licences if they want to
pollute a border-crossing river. The pollutee downstream may then
offer to buy licenses from the upstream polluter.
The proposals made so far have severe shortcomings. The question,
however, is whether a harmonization of national environmental16
policies would generate any better results and what such a policy
would look like. The drawbacks of any centralized environmental
policy are that differences in endowment and in national
preferences regarding environmental quality cannot be recognized.
Therefore, it seems extremely difficult to carry out a policy
that minimizes the costs of achieving a certain environmental
quality. This is an especially strong point in the long run where
the most important task ~is to induce innovation of cheaper
abatement technologies and methods of minimizing or avoiding the
emission of pollutants at all.
The problem of border-crossing river pollution is analytically a
fairly simple one compared with the destruction of the ozone
layer or the greenhouse effect where in most cases not even the
polluters can be determined easily. No promising solutions for a
global environmental policy have been proposed so far. In short,
wherever international technological externalities are involved
the competition approach to integration does not guarantee an
efficient solution.
Strategic Behavior and Institutional Competition
Locational competition, the basic idea for the competition of
legislation, assumes that immobile factors compete for
internationally mobile ones. Governments contribute to the
competitiveness of a location by offering legislation. In a
competitive equilibrium all governments operate so that marginal
costs of providing legislation and marginal benefits are equal.
When an optimum has been reached, cutting the price for
legislation, i.e. lowering taxes, leads to some capital inflow
but also to a lower level of public goods supply. A move away
from the optimum implies a reduction in welfare.
The EC's market for legislation, however, is not fully
competitive due to the small number of governments. Moreover, the
good to be traded in this market, namely legislation, is not
homogeneous but can instead be differentiated. Therefore,
4
governments are put in the position of oligopolists . They can17
affect the "market" price for legislation to some extent which
changes the relations between market participants. Strategic
behavior of governments that may now be relevant takes into
account the expected reactions of other governments to actions
taken by one country. In terms of our reference model the
restrictions to the maximization problem of governments have
changed. This is especially true when the composite commoditiy
feature of legislation is considered. Legislation can be used for
pursuing a variety of policy goals at the same time. One case
where strategic behavior can occur was mentioned earlier. When
technological externalities exist governments have an incentive
to strategically overstate the damage done or the costs of
reducing the externality.
If we consider locational competition as a general theory of
government behavior in an international context a strategic
location policy of governments would be included in this theory
as a special case. Although strategic behavior is a major flaw in
institutional competition most authors have avoided to even take
notice of it. The only area where strategic government behavior
has been analyzed extensively is strategic trade policy. The
premise for this analogy is that free trade is the optimal
solution to the trade issue as is institutional competition to
the integration problem. Strategic trade policy is one way of
carrying out strategic locational policy and it can, therefore,
be considered as a part of the broader competition of location
theory. It is claimed that governments attempt to increase the
attractiveness of a location, for instance by paying export
subsidies to firms, thereby directly increasing the firms'
profits and indirectly their profit opportunities by enabling
them to utilize economies of scale. In international trade, GATT
represents the major effort to cope with strategic behavior like
imposing (optimal) tariffs or subsidizing exports. Without GATT
countries would predictably try to increase their welfare through
strategic behavior, not taking into account that other countries
4) The market structure in the EC could be oligopolistic or of
the Stackelberg type with a leader and a number of followers if
differences in size and economic power are recognized.18
may implement the same measures or retaliate in other ways. In
this case all countries would suffer from strategic behavior.
An important question is how relevant the strategic behavior of
governments towards one another is. As was pointed out earlier,
in some areas the strategic possibilities of governments are
restrained by the opportunity costs they incur through their own
strategic behavior. A government that intends to attract an
industry by lowering its environmental standards incurs a
degradation of the environment and that may not be tolerable to
its electorate. Cutting taxes on mobile capital reduces the funds
available for financing public goods. Another restriction holds
for real capital flows where the absorption capacity in a country
is limited. Moreover, national governments in Europe are small
relative to each other, therefore, it is more difficult to get
involved in strategic games.
The existing literature on strategic behavior of governments is
deficient in an important aspect. Strategic behavior only is
analyzed for a specific part of government activity, for instance
capital income taxation, indirect taxation or export
subsidization. This limitation is necessary to keep the models
manageable. The opportunity costs of government activity are not
considered. Consequently, the strategic aspect is overstated. The
relevance of strategic behavior is reduced if additional aspects
are taken into consideration, for instance the provision of
public goods.
A nuisance for institutional competition is that governments can
become "large" in a strategic sense by product differentiation.
An example for product differentiation is the splitting of
capital income taxation into taxes on physical capital and on
financial capital. A country like Luxembourg could not attract
very much physical capital if it did not tax capital at all. It
could, however, introduce a very low tax rate on financial
capital and thereby attract large amounts of financial capital.
Congestion does not occur as in the case of physical capital and
the marginal cost of lowering the tax rate may be negligible. In
this case, a country does not even have to be large to allow for19
the possibility of strategic behavior. Again, this is the general
problem of taxing highly mobile factors. Avoidance of high taxes
would occur with institutional competition and with harmonization
of tax rates as long as exit to the rest of the world is
possible.
If strategic behavior of governments is relevant for the concept
of institutional competition it is so because it may destroy the
Pareto-optimality of institutional competition. An interesting
aside is the relationship between strategic behavior of
governments and strategic behavior of firms. One important aspect
of institutional competition among governments in Europe is that
it reduces the power of national interest groups and that it can
break a deadlock of given inefficient national regulations due to
vested interests. In this interpretation, national governments do
not behave strategically towards other governments but towards
firms. This is an efficiency improving aspect of institutional
competition.
In the transitional period towards Europe '92 institutional
competition may be a device to reduce the strategic possibilities
of firms. But firms will adjust to the new institutional setting
of competing governments and attempt to behave strategically
vis-a-vis the governments. This is especially relevant in a
rent-seeking environment where prices and incentives are
politicized. In order to restrain the strategic behavior of
firms and to ensure competition among firms a new common set of
rules is necessary in some cases. Competition policy is an
important task in the single European market.
5) An unresolved issue is whether the new strategic alliances of
firms on a global scale represent a matter of concern and how
policy should react.20
VII. An Economic Order for Institutional Competition?
We have shown that institutional competition, in principle, is an
efficient way of integration. It is a useful device for revealing
the benefits and costs of alternative institutional arrangements
and for opening up markets against vested interests. It is a
strategy to evaluate government activities and thus to increase
government efficiency. The activities of governments should be
analyzed both for the expenditure and the revenue side. Because
institutional competition assesses overall government performance
the possibilities for governments to behave strategically in one
area at the expense of other areas are effectively reduced. There
will be many chances for arbitrage of households and firms in the
case of institutional competition as long as those who benefit
from government activities and those who pay for it are not
identical. For governments it is therefore important to look for
institutional arrangements that establish this identity. The
process of institutional competition is a driving force for the
identity of users and payers. Within nations, the internalization
of benefits and costs can be obtained by benefit taxation, user
charges, other forms of private financing and privatization.
In order to assure the efficiency of institutional competition a
set of rules for institutional competition in Europe should be
developed. Such a "Wettbewerbsordnung" should not be understood
as additional regulations for individual firms but as a system of
rules for institutional competition among governments. What would
be the major elements of such a system?
1. Factor mobility, especially capital mobility as the major
force for institutional arbitrage, has to be assured.
Countries are not allowed to restrict capital flows in any
way. Arbitrage of the consumers should not be restrained.
2. The EC should improve its openess to the rest of the world so
that successful legislation can attract mobile resources from
there. Institutional competition inside the EC implies free
trade with the outside.21
3. In addition, remaining market segmentations should be
abolished because they distort the allocation of resources and
open up possibilities for strategic behavior. For instance,
governments should not be allowed to use public procurement
for strategic purposes.
4. A European competition policy for firms is needed in order to
avoid strategic behavior of firms. Institutional competition
of EC governments must be protected from EC-wide monopolies or
cartels because a non-competitive demand side would impair the
efficiency of the market for legislation.
5. In the case of international externalities, rules of
internalization have to be agreed upon. These rules attempt an
extension of the fiscal equivalence concept to nations. In the
case of the environment, ambient diffusion norms or the
polluter-pays principle are cases in point.Appendix
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Table 1 Cross EC investment
Inward in- (Z of total Outward (Z of total
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Source: Giovannini, Hines (1990, p. 59). Investment figures for single years
represent capital stocks; investment figures for multipleyear periods repre-
sent cumulative investment flows.23
Table 2 Stocks of Migrants in the EC
(As per cent of country's total population)
Destination
B F G I LUX NL 2 X
































Germany 0.01 0.03 0 0 0.02 0.06 41.4
Italy 0.11 0.20 0.39 -- 0.02 0.01 0.73 441.6
Luxemb. 0.36 0.22 0.33 0 -- 0.03 0.94 3.4
Netherl. 0.12 0.02 0.23 0 0 0.37 55.9
Stock of im-
migrants 137.6 614.5 526.2 2.2 38.1 58.5 -- 1377.1
from EC-12
(in 000s)
Source: Thomas Straubhaar (1988, p. 61), own calculations.24





































































Source: Tanzi, Bovenberg (1990), IMF - International Financial Statistics,
own calculations.25
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